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Lactose’s Intolerance
THE ROLE OF MANUFACTURERS’ RIGHTS AND
COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH IN BIG DAIRY’S FIGHT
TO RESTRICT USE OF THE TERM “MILK”
INTRODUCTION
A young professional idles in line at their favorite café.
Morning sunlight spills through the windows, bathing the trendy
décor in a bright orange opalescence, as a queue of bleary-eyed
patrons advance, single file toward the counter. The young
professional reaches the front of the line and approaches the barista
to place their daily order. “I’d like a Venti Caffè Latte with soymilk,
please.” “I’m sorry,” the barista responds with feigned enthusiasm,
“we no longer carry soymilk, but we have soy beverage and almond
milk imitation.” Disappointed and unfamiliar with the synthetic
sounding alternatives, the young professional reluctantly amends
their order to a Caffè Latte with one percent milk. Today, soy,
coconut, and almond dairy alternatives allow Americans to exact
control over what they consume, but commonplace product names
and advertisements may soon become a convenience of the past.1
Beginning in the 1970s, the prevalence of non-animalbased substitutes for traditional food products has proliferated
due to growing concerns over nutrition, health, and animal
welfare.2 An increase in the number of Americans with dietary
restrictions, imposed through voluntary constraint and medical
necessity, also contributed to the augmented popularity and
pervasiveness of these products.3 As a result, markets for foods
1 Katie Gates Calderon, Elizabeth Fessler, & Lindsey Heinz, Dairy Vs. PlantBased ‘Milks’: A Regulatory Standoff, LAW360 (Aug. 27, 2017, 10:59 AM EDT),
https://www.law360.com/articles/957097/dairy-vs-plant-based-milks-a-regulatorystandoff [http://perma.cc/A7UK-Q4Q5].
2 Id.; see also Lauren Sipple, What’s in a Name?: The Use of Dairy Product
Names in Labeling of Plant-Based Alternatives, SCI. MEETS FOOD (Dec. 13, 2018),
http://sciencemeetsfood.org/whats-name-use-dairy-product-names-labeling-plant-basedalternatives/ [https://perma.cc/8S4C-XW43] (“Fluid milk consumption in the United
States has declined steadily since the 1970s. . . . Meanwhile, non-dairy milk alternative
sales have grown by over 60% in the last five years, and the dairy alternatives market is
projected to grow to $19.5 billion by 2020.” (citations omitted)).
3 Calderon, et al., supra note 1. In addition to allergies, concerns about a possible
correlation between dairy products and serious diseases likely contribute to the decline in
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derived from animals have been subject to pullback, resulting in
decreased sales and reduced net profits.4 This shift in market
power served as the catalyst for a twenty-year battle between
the dairy5 and plant-based alternatives industries over product
labeling and misrepresentation.6
The fight began in 1997 when the Soyfoods Association of
America (SANA)7 filed a citizen’s petition with the United States
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).8 The entreaty requested
that the Commissioner of the FDA amend Part 102 of U.S. FDA
regulations to include a subsection specifically recognizing soymilk
within the section titled “Common or Unusual Name for
Nonstandardized Foods.”9 The executive agency issued a response
in which it officially acknowledged receipt of the petition but stated
that it was unable to address the issue due to its limited budget
and because it had other, more pressing priorities.10 Notably, the
FDA neither cautioned manufacturers about possible liability for
misrepresentation,11 nor did it take any steps toward amending
dairy consumption in the United States. See, e.g., Health Concerns About Dairy,
PHYSICIANS COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE MED., https://www.pcrm.org/good-nutrition/
nutrition-information/health-concerns-about-dairy [https://perma.cc/N4FW-PRNM] (“Milk
and other dairy products are the top source of saturated fat in the American diet,
contributing to heart disease, type [two] diabetes, and Alzheimer’s disease. Studies have
also linked dairy to an increased risk of breast, ovarian, and prostate cancers.”).
4 Lela Nargi, What’s Behind the Crippling Dairy Crisis? Family Farmers
Speak Out, CIV. EATS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://civileats.com/2018/11/05/whats-behind-thecrippling-dairy-crisis-family-farmers-speak-out/ [https://perma.cc/WTX6-8X3S].
5 In this note, “Dairy” and “Big Dairy” refer to interest groups, large scale
dairy producers, and other influential parties that advocate on behalf of animal milk
producers. For simplicity, this note concentrates on the National Milk Producers
Federation (NMPF) and to a lesser extent, on U.S. Dairy Export Counsel (USDEC), and
International Dairy Foods Association (IDFA).
6 See Michael Pellman Rowland, Got Milk? A Tale of Two Cities, FORBES (Apr.
11, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpellmanrowland/2017/04/11/
milk-industry-controversy/#1c86e0f057e5 [https://perma.cc/J2Q5-5LZW]; see also
Calderon, et al., supra note 1.
7 The Soyfoods Association of North America (SANA) is an advocacy
organization focused on “the health benefits and nutritional advantages of soy
consumption.” About Us, SOYFOODS ASS’N OF NORTH AM., http://www.soyfoods.org/aboutus [https://perma.cc/N27Z-FBGG].
8 FDA-1997-P-0078-0002, Citizen Petition to the FDA from Soyfoods Ass’n of
Am. (Feb. 28, 1997), http://www.soyfoods.org/wp-content/uploads/SANA-CitizenPetition-No.-97P-0078-2-28-97.pdf [http://perma.cc/XML6-YR36] [hereinafter SANA
Citizen Petition]. “Citizens petition” refers to a process through which individuals and
community organizations request that the FDA, or another administrative agency, begin
a rule-making to alter or create rules and regulations. 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.30–10.31 (2018).
9 Sana Citizen Petition, supra note 8, at 1–2.
10 Interim Response Letter from F. Edward Scarbrough, Dir., Ctr. for Food
Safety & Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Peter Golbitz, Comm. Chair,
Soyfoods Ass’n of Am. (Aug. 4, 1997), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?
documentId=FDA-1997-P-0016-0013&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://
perma.cc/T96W-SMSZ] [hereinafter 1997 Scarbrough Interim Response Letter].
11 Upon receipt of the petition, the FDA could have concluded that companies
using “milk” in product names and labels were liable for misrepresentation under 21
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regulations so as to restrict use of the word “milk.”12 Although
seemingly innocuous, the dairy industry quickly viewed the FDA’s
dismissive response as highly disruptive.13
The FDA’s failure to give specific instructions opened the
proverbial floodgates to further confrontations between interest
groups for the dairy industry and their alternative product
counterparts. The National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF),14
SANA, and other interest groups sent letters, taking positions on
issues similar to those addressed the original petition, to the
FDA.15 Despite growing interest, the FDA again failed to offer
guidance to clarify its position on the matter.16
The continued strain between the dairy and plant-based
alternative industries, coupled with public backlash from
consumers purporting to be misled as to the comparability and
health benefits of switching from animal to plant based dairy
products, caused industry leaders to look beyond the FDA and
U.S.C.A § 343(c), which states “[i]f it is an imitation of another food, [the product
manufacturer is liable for misrepresentation] unless its label bears . . . the word
‘imitation’ and, immediately thereafter, the name of the food imitated.” 21 U.S.C. § 343(c)
(2012). Most alternative milk products do not include the word “imitation” in their title,
but rather qualify the term with an alternative food item, followed by the word “milk.”
See, e.g., The Many Flavors of Progress. Taste ‘em All., SILK (2019), https://silk.com/plantbased-products/ [https://perma.cc/J8P7-9XEP].
12 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 131.110 (2018).
13 Letter from Robert D. Byrne, V.P. of Reg. Affairs, Nat’l Milk Prod. Fed’n, to
Joseph A. Levitt, Dir. of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, 2 (Feb. 14, 2000), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA2017-P-1298-0092 [https://perma.cc/Z888-CL8L] [hereinafter 2000 Byrne Letter]
(included as Attachment 11 re Comment from National Milk Producers Federation).
14 NMPF is a special interest organization advocating on behalf of dairy producers
and the United States milk industry in Washington D.C. See News Release, National Milk
Producers Federation, Dairy Organizations Applaud Congressional Letter to the FDA Asking
for Stricter Enforcement of Milk Labeling Standards (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.nmpf.org/
latest-news/press-releases/dec-2016/dairy-organizations-applaud-congressional-letter-fdaasking [https://perma.cc/H6F2-MM4V] [hereinafter NMPF News Release].
15 Letter from Nancy Chapman, Exec. Dir., Soyfoods Association of North
America, to Joseph A. Levitt, Dir. of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition,
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, at *9–12 (Mar. 9, 2000), http://f.datasrvr.com/fr1/
117/64796/soyfoods_2nd_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCQ3-ESVH] [hereinafter 2000
Chapman Letter] (Including Appendix with letters from various organizations, including
the Dean Foods Company, Western Quality Food Products, and Cumberland Dairy in
opposition to NMPF ’ s proposal); see also Good Food Institute, Tell Congress to Dump the
“DAIRY PRIDE Act,” CHANGE.ORG (2018) https://www.change.org/p/u-s-senate-tellcongress-to-dump-the-dairy-pride-act [https://perma.cc/75YN-Y4LG] [hereinafter GFI
Change.org Petition] (detailing GFI’s petition to the Senate which allows individual
citizens to become involved in opposing the DAIRY PRIDE Act. As of April 26, 2019,
50,571 individuals offered their support.).
16 Mia De Graff, War on ‘Fake Milk’: Dairy Industry Begs FDA to Ban Almond and
Soy Alternatives from ‘Masquerading as the Real Thing’—but Do We Care?, DAILY MAIL (Mar.
3, 2017, 3:31 PM EDT), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-4278160/Mayo-wingsbutter-Fake-milk-latest-food-fight.html [https://perma.cc/JJ8C-HHHQ] (“The [NMFP] says it
has been trying to get the FDA to enforce the standard since at least 2000, and that the lack of
enforcement has led to a proliferation of imitators playing ‘fast and loose’ with dairy terms.”).
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to lobby Congress to introduce decisive legislation on the
matter.17 To bring a conclusion to the abiding feud, members of
both houses of Congress introduced the “Defending Against
Imitations and Replacements of Yogurt, Milk, and Cheese to
Promote Regular Intake of Dairy Everyday Act” or the “DAIRY
PRIDE Act,” in January 2017.18 As proposed, however, the
content-based restriction advanced in the DAIRY PRIDE Act
implicates significant questions as to the practicability and
constitutionality of the proposed solution.
If passed, the DAIRY PRIDE Act will amend the
misbranding section of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act19 and require the FDA to “issue draft guidance on how
enforcement” would be carried out within ninety days of the bill’s
ratification.20 In effect, the bill would force milk alternative
product manufacturers to remove “milk” and other dairy specific
words from product names, packaging, and advertisements or
further qualify such terms by adding language like “substitute” or
“imitation” to avoid enforcement action.21 Such a prohibition
places a content-based restriction on commercial speech,
effectively curbing manufacturers’ right to describe and advertise
their products, and as such may impose an unconstitutional
restriction on their First Amendment right to free speech.22
This note examines the relationship between proposed
restrictions of commercial speech and manufacturers’ First
Amendment right to describe products to consumers. This note
argues that broad, content-based commercial speech
restrictions, like that proposed in the DAIRY PRIDE Act, likely
impose unconstitutional limits on manufacturers’ First
Amendment right to freedom of speech. The note proposes that
Congress and the FDA should refrain from passing a statute or
promulgating a regulation like the DAIRY PRIDE Act, because
NMPF News Release, supra note 14.
See S. 130, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017–2018); H.R. 778, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017–2018).
Because the 115th Congress ended in 2018, the DAIRY PRIDE Act was reintroduced in
March 2019. See S. 792, 116th Cong. (2019–2020); H.R. 1769, 116th Cong. (2019–2020).
19 S. 130 § 3 (“No food may be introduced or delivered for introduction into
interstate commerce using a market name for a dairy product if the food does not meet the
criterion set forth for dairy products under paragraph (z)(2) of section 403 of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. [§ ]343) (as added by section 4(a))”); see also H.R. 778 § 3.
20 S. 130 § 4(b)(1); H.R. 778 § 4(b)(1); see also DAIRY PRIDE Act One Pager,
National Milk Producers Federation, http://www.nmpf.org/files/DAIRY%20PRIDE%20
Act%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMK6-QFMY].
21 S. 130 § 4(b)(1); H.R. 778 § 4(b)(1); see also 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) (2012).
22 See FDA-2017-P-1298, Citizen Petition from Good Food Inst. to Recognize the
Use of Well-Established Common and Usual Compound Nomenclatures for Food, at 35 (Mar.
2, 2017), http://www.gfi.org/images/uploads/2017/03/GFIpetitionFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5E29-YPES] [hereinafter GFI Citizen Petition]; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (The First
Amendment states “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
17
18
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such limitations likely impede on manufacturers’ rights, and in
practice, would allow the Dairy industry to create a de facto
monopoly in an increasingly competitive market.23
This note proceeds in the following parts. Part I provides
a brief history of the conflict between big dairy and plant-based
alternative product manufacturers. This Part also explores
existing statutes, guidance proffered by regulatory agencies, and
their significance to the present conflict. Part II describes the
First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech in the context
of manufacturers’ rights and analyzes the restrictions proposed in
the DAIRY PRIDE Act under the test for determining whether
such restrictions are lawful exercises of legislative power through
the four-part test from Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York.24 Finally, Part III
proposes that adding regulations to control the proportions and
location of disclaimers on product labels and in advertising would
serve the government’s stated purpose for advancing the DAIRY
PRIDE Act without implicating the level of constitutional
scrutiny triggered by content-based speech restrictions.
I.

THE TWENTY-YEAR STRUGGLE OVER “MILK”

The conflict between the dairy and plant-based
alternative industries over use of the word “milk” in product
names and advertisements, began more than twenty years ago.
In February 1997, SANA petitioned the FDA to amend their
existing “Common or Unusual Name for Nonstandardized
Foods” regulation to recognize “soymilk” as the correct name for
“the liquid food that is obtained as a result of combining
aqueous-extracted whole soybean solids and water, or, as a
result of combining other edible-quality soy protein solids,
soybean oil, and water.”25 The petition cited the accuracy of the
beverage’s name,26 the long-term existence of the product in the
United States and abroad,27 and the prevalence of the term
23 It is unclear whether passing the DAIRY PRIDE Act will actually cause an
increase in dairy product sales. For example, Canada banned plant-based products from
being labeled “milk” in 2009, but purchase of dairy products has continued to decline.
Michelle St. Pierre, Changes in Canadians’ Preferences for Milk and Dairy Products,
1960 to 2015, STATISTICS CANADA (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/dailyquotidien/170421/dq170421e-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q8X-HUTQ].
24 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
25 SANA Citizen Petition, supra note 8, at 1.
26 Id. at 2.
27 Id. at 3. (citing SOYBEAN BLUE BOOK 72 (Am. Soybean Ass’n 1947); Harry
W. Miller & C. Jean Wen, Experimental Nutrition Studies of Soymilk in Human
Nutrition, 50 CHINESE MED. J. 450–59 (1936)).
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“soymilk” in official and industry publications as persuasive
evidence for altering the regulation.28 The FDA issued a response
officially acknowledging receipt of the petition but declining to
address the issue further.29 In 2000, NMPF indirectly responded
by submitting a trade complaint to the FDA concerning the
“rapidly expanding misuse of the name of a standardized food in
the labeling of certain food products.”30 NMPF’s trade complaint
argued that the word “milk” should be read pursuant to 21
C.F.R. § 131.110, which defines the term as the “lacteal
secretion, practically free from colostrum, obtained by the
complete milking of one or more healthy cows.”31
In response, SANA submitted a follow-up letter to
NMPF’s correspondence; here, SANA admitted that NMPF’s
interpretation of the word “milk” was not incorrect, but
maintained that the statute should be read narrowly.32 SANA
argued that the term soymilk did not violate the FDA’s definition
of “milk” or its standard of identity, because the language of the
regulation limited its scope to the unqualified, or standalone,
term. Thus, by referring to the alternative beverage as “soymilk,”
SANA claimed that their product name fell outside the scope of
the FDA regulation.33 Again, the FDA issued a letter recognizing
receipt of the petition, but the agency abstained from taking
action or offering guidance in response to either party’s requests,
apparently due to a lack of sufficient economic resources and the
low priority afforded to resolving the conflict.34 In 2008 and 2012,
the FDA issued warning letters to two different soy product
manufacturers, but thus far, the FDA has not pursued further
enforcement action against either company, even though the
conduct at issue appears to be ongoing.35
Id. at 3–4.
1997 Scarbrough Interim Response Letter, supra note 10.
30 2000 Byrne Letter, supra note 13, at 1.
31 Id. at 2 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 131.110 (2000)). Merriam-Webster defines
“colostrum” as “milk secreted for a few days after childbirth and characterized by high
protein and antibody content.” Colostrum, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/colostrum [https://perma.cc/J6EE-TSKV].
32 2000 Chapman Letter, supra note 15, at 1–2.
33 Id. at 2–3.
34 See Letter from Loretta A. Carey, Div. of Standards & Labeling Regs., U.S.
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. to Nancy Chapman, Exec. Dir., Soyfoods Ass’n of N.
Am. (July 31, 2000) (on file with Brooklyn Law Review) (acknowledging receipt of letters
and agreeing to consider altering their regulations, or in the alternative to reach a
decision on how such regulations would be enforced, but conditioned any action on the
allocation of sufficient resources for the 2001 fiscal year by the Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition). It may be assumed that the Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition failed to adequately finance further exploration of the issue for the 2001 fiscal
year because the FDA did not pursue this issue further.
35 Letter from Barbara J. Cassen, Dist. Dir., Pub. Health Serv., U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, to Yan Hui Fang, CEO, Fong Kee Tofu Co., Inc. (Mar. 7, 2012),
28
29
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After decades of litigation and numerous appeals to the
FDA,36 the Good Food Institute (GFI) submitted a new petition
to the FDA in March 2017, with a request similar to the SANA’s
1997 citizen’s petition.37 Several additional organizations,
including the New York Bar City Association, also sent
correspondence in opposition to the DAIRY PRIDE Act to the
FDA.38 In a letter, the FDA acknowledged receipt of the petition,
but further action remains to be seen.39 While continuing to
pursue FDA guidance, dissatisfaction with the present
ambiguity led leaders in the dairy industry to seek alternative
solutions, including pursuing litigation to strengthen and
enforce FDA regulations in their favor.
Despite strong opposition to restricting use of the term
40
“milk,” members of Congress have begun to rally together
around the dairy industry by introducing the DAIRY PRIDE
Act.41 Apparently advanced to counter the FDA’s silence, the
https://www.fdalabelcompliance.com/letters/ucm295239 [https://perma.cc/8SER-5GWB];
Letter from Alonza E. Cruise, Dist. Dir., Pub. Health Serv., U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, to Long H. Lai, Lifesoy, Inc. (Aug. 8, 2008), https://www.fdalabel
compliance.com/letters/ucm1048184 [https://perma.cc/V2GA-FVPM]; see also GFI Citizen
Petition, supra note 22, at 26 n.69 (recognizing that the FDA had issued two warning
letters to Fong Kee Tofu Co. and Lifesoy, in 2012 and 2008, respectively).
36 Notably, NMPF submitted a comment in the “Point of Purchase Nutrition
Information (Front-of Pack and Shelf Tag Nutrition Symbols), Docket No. FDA-2010-N0210” rulemaking, asking “the FDA to significantly increase enforcement efforts to
prevent misbranding of certain food items that are imitations of standardized dairy
products,” in July of 2010. Nat’l Milk Prod. Fed’n, Comment Letter on Point of Purchase
Nutrition Information (Front-of Pack and Shelf Tag Nutrition Symbols), Docket No.
FDA-2010-N-0210 (July 28, 2010), http://law-bites.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/
NMPFcomment2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8FD-776J].
37 GFI Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 1.
38 LORI A. BARRETT & CARLA A. LATTY, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.,
REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE ANIMAL LAW COMMITTEE AND THE CONSUMER AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE (2017), http://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/201782-Dairy
PrideAct_FINAL_3.1.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/37Q9-XXE5].
39 Interim Response Letter from Douglas A. Balentine, Dir., Ctr. for Food
Safety & Applied Nutrition, to Nigel Barrella, Good Food Inst. (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2017-P-12980091&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/NEY4-C7FF].
40 See, e.g., Michele Simon, Plant Based Coalition Lobbies Congress to Oppose
Dairy Pride Act, PRWEB (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/14866415.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P6ZA-MG4P] (“[A]dvocates and organizations representing manufacturers
of plant-based foods, including the Soyfoods Association of North America, the Good Food
Institute, Blue Diamond, and Campbell Soup Company, have come together to oppose the
Dairy Pride Act.”); see also GFI Change.org Petition, supra note 15; Eric M. Erba & Andrew
M. Novakovic, The Evolution of Milk Pricing and Government Intervention in Dairy Markets,
CORNELL PROGRAM ON DAIRY MARKETS AND PRICING 6–16 (Feb. 1995), https://
dairymarkets.org/pubPod/pubs/EB9505.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFL6-S5BT] (demonstrating
that Congress has taken an active role subsidizing the dairy industry since it passed the
Agriculture Adjustment Act in 1933).
41 DAIRY PRIDE Act Supporters Keep Grassroots Pressure on Congress, NAT’L
MILK PROD. FED’N (2018), http://www.nmpf.org/latest-news/articles/dairy-pride-actsupporters-keep-grassroots-pressure-congress [https://perma.cc/ZJ45-J7XA] (stating
that support for the DAIRY PRIDE Act continues to grow through grassroot efforts and
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DAIRY PRIDE Act, as proposed, would alter section 403 of the
Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act42 to include “[n]o food may be
introduced or delivered into interstate commerce using a market
name for a dairy product” unless it “contains as a primary
ingredient, or is derived from a lateral secretion, particularly
free from colostrum, obtained by the complete milking of one or
more hooved animals.”43 The bill defines the phrase “market
name for a dairy product” as meeting definitions set forth for
milk, heavy cream, sour cream, yogurt, various cheeses derived
from milk, ice cream derived from cow’s milk, goat’s milk, and
cow milk sherbet, as well as additional definitions set forth in
“any successor regulations or any other term for which the
Secretary has promulgated a standard of identity with respect
to a food that is formulated with a dairy product . . . as the
primary ingredient.”44 In practice, the DAIRY PRIDE Act
prohibits manufacturers of alternative dairy foods from using
“milk,” “ice cream,” “yogurt,” and “cheese” in their product
names and advertisements.45 Interestingly, in September of
2018, the FDA followed suit and opened a non-rulemaking notice
and comment period titled, “Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in
the Labeling of Plant-Based Products,”46 and extended the
comment period through January 2019.47 In January 2019,
NMPF submitted a new citizen petition to the FDA, and in
response, the agency again initiated a non-rulemaking notice
and comment period, here extending from February 2019 to
August 2019.48 As of May 2019, no further action has been taken
with regard to this initiative. However, the former
Commissioner of the FDA, Scott Gottlieb, apparently indicated
that producing an FDA guidance document on use of the term
congressional backing from Senators King, Baldwin, Stabenow, Risch, and Crapo and
Representatives Welch, Simpson, Duffy, Courtney, Valadao, DelBene, Peterson,
Gallagher, Grothman, Kind, Rooney, Sensenbrenner, Nolan, Stefanik, and Comer).
42 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403, 52 Stat. 1040, 1047 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). Section 403 of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act regulates misbranded food, nutritional labeling, and disclosures.
43 S. 130, 115th Cong. §§ 3, 4(a)(2) (2017).
44 S. 130. § 4(a)(3) (internal parenthesis omitted).
45 See S. 130 § 3.
46 Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based products, Notice,
Request for Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,103 (Sept. 28, 2018). The FDA requested comments
on “how consumers use these plant-based products . . . . [and] whether consumers are aware
of and understand the basic nature, essential characteristics, characterizing ingredients, and
nutritional differences between plant-based products and dairy foods.” Id.
47 Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based products,
Notice, Extension of Comment Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,775 (Nov. 21, 2018).
48 See generally FDA-2019-p-0777-0001, Citizen Petition Submitted on Behalf of the
National Milk Producers Federation (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?
D=FDA-2019-P-0777-0001 [https://perma.cc/PZS3-QFB2] [hereinafter NMPF Citizen Petition].
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“milk,” would take “close to a year,” possibly indicating that the
agency is currently pursuing action on the topic.49
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
RESTRICTIONS PROPOSED IN THE DAIRY PRIDE ACT

A.

Commercial Speech Jurisprudence

The First Amendment states, inter alia, “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”50 Although
significantly more limited than individuals’ rights, non-natural
persons, like corporations, possess a constitutionally protected
right to free speech.51 There is no explicit discussion of or reference
to commercial speech in the Constitution that would distinguish
it from non-commercial expression.52 In fact, the Supreme Court
did not recognize commercial speech as protected by the
Constitution until the latter half of the twentieth century.53 The
Court first addressed and dismissed the concept of protected
commercial speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen.54 Following
Valentine,55 however, the Court revisited questions regarding
commercial speech and incrementally accepted commercial
expression as a protected right.56
The Supreme Court recognized commercial speech as
protected under the First Amendment in 1976 through Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.57 The Court imposed limits on government regulation of
49 Edward Hale, Got Soy Beverage?, REG. REV. (Mar. 10, 2019), https://
www.theregreview.org/2019/03/20/hale-got-soy/ [https://perma.cc/LP9L-VD3Q] (internal
quotations omitted).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (“[T]he speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot
simply be speech on a commercial subject.”).
52 U.S. CONST. amend I. The failure of the Constitution to distinguish between
types of speech does not, in itself, mean that commercial expression automatically falls
within a protected category, but rather indicates that arguments must be based on
additional sources. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?,
76 VA. L. REV. 627, 631 (1990). For example, “[T]he Constitution doesn’t mention child
pornography either, and we know it receives no protection at all.” Id. (citing New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
53 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution
imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”).
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964).
56 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia., 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“Advertising is
not . . . stripped of all First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech to the
marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”).
57 Va. State Bd of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761–62 (1976). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court determined
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commercial speech, but chose not to define the type of content
that would fall outside of the protected category.58 In subsequent
decisions, the Supreme Court articulated two variances between
protected commercial and individual speech.59 First, commercial
speech is more objective than noncommercial expression because
the accuracy of statements can be verified more easily.60 Second,
commercial speech is more durable than its noncommercial
counterpart because it “is engaged in for profit,” and as such, is
less likely to be “chilled by proper regulation.”61
Although the Court provided some guidance, commercial
speech still occupies a “position at the blurry crossroads of expressive
and economic activity.”62 Protections of commercial speech represent
an “attempt to reconcile heightened protection for free speech with
legitimate deference to economic regulation [which] has generated
strain and untidiness in commercial speech doctrine.”63
At its core, “the doctrine of commercial speech rests on a
clean distinction between the market for ideas and the market
for goods and services.”64 The First Amendment creates strict
safeguards to protect persons from government regulation of
ideas, while majoritarian politics generally control in the

restricting commercial enterprises from advertising to be unconstitutional based on the
First Amendment, even if a party’s interest proves to be wholly economic. Id. at 761–62.
The Court rejected the idea that expression with no purpose beyond proposing one or
more commercial transactions was “so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and from
‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government,’ that it lacks all protection.” Id. at 762 (citations omitted)
(first quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), then quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
58 Id. at 761 (“If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First
Amendment protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech
whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject.”).
59 Id. at 771–72 n.24 (1976); see also e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980); Freedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
60 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 52, at 634.
61 Id.
62 Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58
MD. L. REV. 55, 146 (1999). The Court articulated the accepted definition of commercial
speech in Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm’n on Human Relations, wherein it was
described as speech that only “propose[s] a commercial transaction.” 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973). Dicta in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy somewhat clarified the doctrine by giving
examples of speech falling outside of the scope of commercial expression. 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976). The Court excluded expression projected by or made to solicit money, speech
about commercial topics, and factual expression on a commercial subject from the scope
of commercial speech. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 52, at 638; see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761; N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
63 Stern, supra note 62, at 146 (footnotes omitted).
64 Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
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economic sphere.65 As such, commercial speech is “subject to
numerous restrictions that would be unconstitutional if applied
to [noncommercial speech].”66 Courts have applied different tests
and methods of analysis to resolve questions of whether a
particular type of speech is commercial, and if it is, whether a
regulation withstands constitutional scrutiny.67 A court’s
determination of whether a particular form of expression
constitutes commercial speech, “represents a categorical
approach that affords scope for the individualized adjustments
associated with balancing tests.”68 The “combination of
coherence and flexibility offers a constructive framework for
dealing with an intrinsically untidy area.”69 The Court
established the main test for commercial speech in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Services Commission.70
Content-based restrictions of commercial speech trigger a
level of evaluation comparable to intermediate scrutiny.71 To
survive an intermediate scrutiny analysis, statutes must further
an important government interest and the means employed must
be substantially related to that interest.72 Likewise, the four-part
test used to evaluate whether restrictions on commercial
expression impose unconstitutional restraints on such speech73
requires that the government interest be substantial and that the
restriction reasonably advance that interest.74 Moreover, in the
context of a Central Hudson analysis, the government’s interest
for restricting commercial speech cannot be exemplary of naked

65 Id. (“[I]n the economic sphere . . . the majoritarian political process controls.”)
Natural persons enjoy additional safeguards not extended to business associations or nonnatural persons; one example of these safeguards is the overbreadth doctrine, which allows a
party to challenge a law restricting free speech on the ground that it may curtail another
individual’s First Amendment rights, despite otherwise lacking sufficient standing to
challenge the law. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 496–97 (1982); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV.
844, 844–45 (1970).(“[T]he overbreadth doctrine does not [extend] to commercial speech.”).
66 Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 64, at 2.
67 Michael Mazur, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment in the 21st
Century Does the Nike Test Help Keep Corporations Honest?, 5 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 999,
999–1000 (2005).
68 Stern, supra note 62, at 142.
69 Id.
70 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
71 Commercial Speech Restrictions, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (May 2016) (on file with
Brooklyn Law Review). At first blush, the Central Hudson test appears more akin to a
strict scrutiny analysis, but the Court declined to extend such an analysis to commercial
speech in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001).
72 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1972).
73 See discussion infra Section II.B.
74 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564.
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paternalism.75 The court will likely analyze challenges to the
DAIRY PRIDE Act by applying the Central Hudson test.76
B.

Application of the Central Hudson Test to the Non-Dairy
Product’s “Milk” Label

After determining that a form of speech is commercial, most
modern courts utilize the four-part test articulated in Central
Hudson.77 Due to the nature of the restriction in the DAIRY PRIDE
Act, it appears clear that the bill seeks to regulate commercial
speech through a content-based restriction and without imposing a
limitation on individual speech. This constraint, if enacted, would
regulate the names of products sold to consumers, but would not
place any real restriction on individual speech.
After establishing that the statute would impose a
restriction to commercial speech, courts will likely move to
analyze the proposed restrictions under the four-part Central
Hudson test. Under this test, a reviewing court first asks,
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, [a court] ask[s] whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, [the reviewing court] must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.78

See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374–76 (2002).
In its most recent citizen petition, NMPF attempts to supplement the Central
Hudson analysis with the standard articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of the Supreme Court of Ohio. NMPF Citizen Petition, supra note 48, at 44–65. In Zauderer,
the Court declined to follow Central Hudson’s four-part test, reasoning that disclosure
requirements are fundamentally different from prohibitions, and as such, determined that
the government need only demonstrate that “disclosure requirements are reasonably related
to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio., 741 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). It should be
noted that Zauderer and its progeny apply when the government seeks to compel disclosure
of factual and uncontroversial information, whereas Central Hudson applies when the
government wishes to impose a restriction on commercial speech. See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v.
USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s analysis of the
disclosure requirement in Zauderer does not reformulate the Central Hudson standard but
rather establishes a different standard based on the ‘material differences between disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650));
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Commercial disclosure
requirements are treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because
mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core
First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or protecting
individual liberty interests.”). The DAIRY PRIDE Act, if enacted, would prohibit non-dairy
product manufacturers from using words like “milk” in product names and advertisements,
and as such should be analyzed under the Central Hudson framework.
77 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
78 Id.
75
76
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To adequately apply Central Hudson’s four-part test, courts
consider the commercial expression at issue and its context; all four
factors must be satisfied to uphold a restriction on commercial
speech.79 Although the reasons for regulating speech espoused in
the DAIRY PRIDE Act demonstrate a substantial governmental
interest, the speech at issue is not inherently deceptive, the means
of regulation may not advance the government’s stated goal, and
the restriction is not a reasonable fit for advancing the
government’s interest. As such, the DAIRY PRIDE Act will likely
fail to withstand a Central Hudson analysis.
1. Whether the Commercial Speech Is Unlawful or May
Mislead Consumers
Determining whether speech is deceptive or unlawful,
under the first part of the Central Hudson test, does not require
extensive constitutional analyses. Rather, only intrinsically
misleading speech categorically falls outside of First
Amendment protections and, as such, outside the scope of
analysis under Central Hudson.80 The Court couches potentially
misleading speech within the scope of protected expression and
analyzes it under a heightened level of scrutiny.81 Thus, any
government restriction must be narrowly tailored to a
substantial state interest.82 The government carries the burden
of demonstrating that its interest in curtailing deception is
substantial and directly and narrowly tailored.83
The government likely will not be able to demonstrate that
product names like soymilk and almond milk inherently mislead
consumers,84 even though proponents of the DAIRY PRIDE Act
often refer to the names of products like “soymilk” or “almond
milk” as “misleading” in rhetoric.85 Alternative dairy products
have used names like soymilk, almond milk, and coconut milk for
decades;86 such names, which include the name of the traditional
product with an additional qualifying word or phrase
accompanying the product name, appear pervasively throughout
Id.
See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing, inter alia,
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
81 Id. at 655–56.
82 Id.
83 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993).
84 See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing the “inherently
misleading” standard as having an “awesome impact,” bound to mislead consumers).
85 See, e.g., S. 130, 115th Cong. § 2(6) (2017).
86 SANA Citizen Petition, supra note 8, at 2–3 (citing Harry W. Miller & C.
Jean Wen, Experimental Nutrition Studies of Soymilk in Human Nutrition, 50 CHINESE
MED. J., 450, 450–59 (1936)).
79
80
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the market, without confusing consumers.87 Courts have
considered the issue on numerous occasions and determined that
no reasonable consumer would be deceived by qualified product
names.88 It must be conceded that products bearing names
commonly associated with another product may have the
potential to deceive consumers, but courts have determined that
consumers generally understand and are not confused by
products bearing qualified dairy product names.89
2. Whether the Government Possesses a Substantial
Interest in Restricting Commercial Speech
The government possesses a legitimate and substantial
interest in ensuring that product names and other information
presented to consumers accurately represent the product being
sold, and in increasing national health.90 The findings advanced
as justifications for the enactment of the DAIRY PRIDE Act,
particularly claims relating to national health, demonstrate the
existence of a legitimate government interest. These findings
include: (1) the majority of individuals in the United States,
including both adults and children, fail to meet their
recommended dairy intake, as set forth in the 2015–2020
Dietary Guidelines for Americans, a publication by the
Department for Health and Human Services and Department of
Agriculture,91 potentially leading to serious or deadly diseases;92
87 See Letter from Nancy Chapman, Exec. Dir., Soyfoods Ass’n of N. Am., to
Stephen Ostroff, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., and Susan T. Mayne, Dir., Ctr.
for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition 3 (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.soyfoods.org/wp-content/
uploads/FDA_Letter_from-SANA-2.2.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6SC-KN67] [hereinafter
2017 Chapman Letter]. In 2006, a member of SANA commissioned a professional market
research organization, Market Tools, to perform a study to gauge customer perception and
understanding of “soymilk.” Id. The firm surveyed 814 people and found that only three
percent of people surveyed believed the product contained cow’s milk. Id.
88 See, e.g., Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 1:17-cv-00117, 2015 WL 9121232, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015) (“Soymilk . . . does not ‘purport [ ] to be’ from a cow within the
meaning of section 343(g).” (alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343(g) (2012))); Ang
v. Whitewave Foods Co., No. 13-CV-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013).
89 Gitson, 2015 WL 9121232, at *2; Ang, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4.
90 What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm
[https://perma.cc/VTD6-PJYP].
91 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2015–
2020 DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 23, 49 (8th ed. 2015), https://health.gov/
dietaryguidelines/2015/resources/2015-2020_Dietary_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B7ME-6P89] [hereinafter DIETARY GUIDELINES]. Notably, the “[a]verage dairy intake for
most young children ages [one] to [three] years meets recommended amounts, but all
other age groups have average intakes that are below recommendations.” Id. at 49.
Further, the 2015–2020 Dietary Guidelines for Americans includes soymilk as part of
the recommended dairy products. Id. at 23, 49.
92 S. 130, 115th Cong. § 2(1) (2017).
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(2) dairy foods provide key nutrients, including vitamin D,
calcium, potassium and magnesium;93 (3) women are less likely
to receive the recommended amount of calcium compared to
their male counterparts;94 (4) plant-based milk alternative
products do not possess the same amount of vitamin D and
potassium as cow’s milk;95 (5) imitation products do not provide
the same nutritional value as products made from dairy cows;96
(7) the FDA defines milk narrowly, excluding plant-based
alternatives;97 and (6/8) enforcement should be improved
because the proliferation of milk imitation products in the
marketplace puts consumers at risk of being deceived.98
While some of the justifications articulated in the bill rely
on incomplete or disproven information, other considerations,
especially those relating to health and consumer protection,
should be considered as legitimate government interests. Thus,
Congress possesses a legitimate interest in promoting accuracy
in the information presented to the public, especially as it
appears on consumable products.99
3. Whether the Proposed Regulation Directly Advances
the Government’s Expressed Interest
Under the Central Hudson test, a regulation must directly
advance a substantial government interest.100 Although less
exacting than a strict scrutiny analysis, to satisfy this part of the
test the government must demonstrate that the DAIRY PRIDE Act
directly advances consumer health and financial protection.101
The DAIRY PRIDE Act professes to protect consumers
from misconceptions and deception caused by the product names
and labels of dairy alternative goods. Although the FDA has
been largely silent on the deceptiveness of non-dairy labels, the
federal judiciary recently offered an interpretation of the present
regulatory and legislative framework. The courts, however,
Id. § 2(2).
Id. § 2(3).
95 Id. § 2(4).
96 Id. § 2(5).
97 Id. § 2(7).
98 Id. §§ 2(6), 2(8). Despite being parroted about as one of the most common
reasons for enacting the DAIRY PRIDE Act, statistical evidence and judicial decisions
disprove the theory that customers are misled by the plant-based alternative products.
See, e.g., 2017 Chapman Letter, supra note 87, at 2–3; see also Ang v. Whitewave Foods
Co., No. 13-CV-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013).
99 What Does FDA Regulate?, supra note 90.
100 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566, 569 (1980).
101 Id. at 566.
93
94
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reached the opposite conclusion to that asserted by the drafters
of the DAIRY PRIDE Act.102
Federal courts recently deemed it inconceivable that a
reasonable consumer103 would be misled into thinking products
bearing the names like soymilk or almond milk actually contain
cow’s milk. In Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co., the court rejected
the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant misbranded products by
using titles like “almond milk” in the names of their foods.104 The
plaintiff argued that 21 C.F.R. § 131.110 defines milk as coming
from a cow, and stated that products bearing names using the
same term, like almond milk, coconut milk, and soymilk create
an identical belief in consumers.105 The court dismissed the
plaintiff’s claims, stating “[i]t is simply implausible that a
reasonable consumer would mistake a product like soymilk or
almond milk with dairy milk from a cow. The first words in the
products’ names should be obvious enough to even the least
discerning of consumers.”106
Likewise, in Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., a federal district
court determined use of the word “soymilk” in Trader Joe’s products
did not violate the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.107 The
court held that “[t]he reasonable consumer (indeed, even the least
sophisticated consumer) does not think soymilk comes from a cow.
To the contrary, people drink soymilk in lieu of cow’s milk.”108
Moreover, the FDA already requires manufacturers to
use qualifying language to aid consumers in distinguishing milk
products from non-dairy substitutes, further limiting the ability
of the legislation like the DAIRY PRIDE Act to meet its stated
goals. To avoid consumer deception, the FDA utilizes standards
of identity, codified in section 403(g) of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,109 to evaluate whether a product that incorporates
the name of a standardized food unlawfully misleads consumers.
The Act states, inter alia, that products using the name of
statutorily defined foods are misbranded if they
Compare Ang, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 with S. 130, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
Ang at *4 (“False advertising claims under the [California state law] are
governed by the reasonable consumer standard, whereby a plaintiff must show that
members of the public are likely to be deceived.” (citing Williams v. Gerber Products Co.,
552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.2008))).
104 Id. at *4.
105 Id. at *3.
106 Id. at *4.
107 Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 13-cv-01333-VC, 2015 WL 9121232, at *6–7
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2015); see also 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012 & Supp. V. 2018) (setting out
the prohibition against misbranding in the FDCA); id. § 343.
108 Gitson, 2015 WL 9121232, at *1.
109 Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403, 52 Stat. 1047 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(g)).
102
103
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purport [ ] to be or [are] represented as a food for which a definition
and standard of identity has been prescribed by regulations as
provided by section 341 of this title, unless. . . [they] conform [ ] to
such definition and standard, and [their] label bears the name of the
food specified in the definition and standard.110

Notably, the Court interprets the words “purport” and
“represent” to suggest “the idea of counterfeit.”111 In Gitson, the
court determined that
the fact that the FDA has standardized milk does not categorically
preclude a company from giving any food product a name that includes
the word “milk.” Rather as the language of section 343(g) indicates, the
standardization of “milk” simply means a company cannot pass off a
product as milk if it does not meet the regulatory definition of “milk.”112

The court went on to determine that Trader Joe’s soymilk never
attempted to pass itself off as milk, as evidenced by use of “soy”
in the product label.113
The drafters of the DAIRY PRIDE Act, however, reached
an opposite interpretation, explicitly stating “[p]lant-based
products labeled as milk are misleading to consumers,” among
the legislative findings necessitating the enactment of the bill,
but without including any corroborating evidence supporting the
assertion.114 Further, it appears the drafters of the Act failed to
acknowledge another FDA regulation, which asserts that the
presence of a standard of identity “does not necessarily preclude
the use of the standardized name in connection with the name
of a nonstandarized food, and ‘in some cases it may be necessary
to . . . provide the consumer with accurate, descriptive, and fully
informative labeling.’”115 Based on these contrary judicial
findings and FDA regulations inconsistent with the consumer
protection rationale expressed in the DAIRY PRIDE Act, the
Act’s content-based restriction on speech will likely not advance
the government’s interest.116

Id. (emphasis added).
62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951); see also GFI
Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 17–18.
112 Gitson, 2015 WL 9121232, at *2 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343(g)).
113 Id.
114 S. 130, 115th Cong. § 2(6) (2017).
115 Nonfat Dry Milk, low-fat Dry Milk, Dry Whole Milk, and Dry Cream;
Standards of Identity; Confirmation of Effective Date and a Further Amendment, 44
Fed. Reg. 3964, 3965 (Jan. 19, 1979) (quoting Imitation Foods; Application of the Term
“Imitation,” 38 Fed. Reg. 20702, 20703 (Aug. 2, 1973)).
116 See BARRETT & LATTY, supra note 38, at 2–5 (arguing that the government’s
interest in consumer protection will not be advanced by the DAIRY PRIDE Act because
the underlying problem, that consumers are being misled by the term “milk” in names
and advertisements of non-dairy substitute products, does not exist).
110
111
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In addition to consumer protection, the DAIRY PRIDE
Act claims to advance consumer health, but these legislative
findings misrepresent recommendations in the Dietary
Guidelines published by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services and the United States Department of
Agriculture. The legislative findings relevant here claim that
dairy products play an important role in individual health for
adults and children, that most Americans are not meeting their
recommended dairy intake, and that dairy products provide
consumers with nutrients under consumed by most
Americans.117 The aforementioned legislative findings rely on
dietary guidelines published by the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Department of Agriculture, but they
fail to disclose one critical piece of information:118 Fortified
soymilk is included under “Dairy” in the Dietary Guidelines for
2015–2020.119 As such, all of the health findings articulated in
the legislative justifications apply to at least one plant-based
milk alternative product.120 Moreover, the Dietary Guidelines
recommend that the American populous increase consumption
of certain foods in the dairy group, including fortified soymilk.121
Similar to the government’s consumer protection motive, the
Act’s content-based speech restriction will likely not advance the
government’s interest to promote individual health.122
4. Whether the Restraint Imposes Limitations More
Extensive Than Necessary to Satisfy a Substantial
Government Interest
Even if a court determines that the DAIRY PRIDE Act
advances the government’s expressed interests, the government
will, nevertheless, fail to satisfy the final element of the Central
Hudson analysis. Unlike the other parts of the test, which
remain largely unaltered from those set forth in the initial
decision, the Court has revised, and ultimately watered down,
the final analysis prong.123 In Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox,
S.130, 115th Cong. §§ 2(1)–(3) (2017).
BARRETT & LATTY, supra note 38, at 5 (“Astonishingly, the legislative
findings fail to disclose a crucial fact: The Dietary Guidelines include fortified soymilk
in the dairy group.”).
119 DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note 91, at 23.
120 Id.; see also S. 130, 115th Cong. §§ 2(1), 2(2), 2(4) (2017).
121 Id. at 49.
122 See BARRETT & LATTY, supra note 38, at 5.
123 This is not to say the Court never altered the other prongs of the Central
Hudson test. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 343–
44 (1986), the Court diluted the scrutiny afforded by Central Hudson to rational basis
review. See also id. at 353 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In rejecting appellant’s equal
117
118
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the Supreme Court modified the original least-restrictive-means
test, which required statutes restricting commercial speech be
the least restrictive means to advance a substantial interest.124
Now, however, restrictions on commercial speech need only be a
“reasonable fit” for advancing a substantial government interest
to satisfy Central Hudson.125 Even analyzed under this lower
standard, it remains unlikely that the restrictions set forth in
the DAIRY PRIDE Act provide a reasonable fit to accomplish the
government’s stated goals.
The governmental interests advanced in the DAIRY
PRIDE Act, which asserts to increase national health and
assuage consumer confusion, are incompatible with the means set
forth for achieving them, and thus, do not provide a reasonable
solution for accomplishing the Act’s purpose. First, there is a lack
of credible research suggesting that a reasonable consumer is
unable to distinguish almond, coconut, or other non-dairy milk
alternatives from traditional dairy milk, with the products’
current labels.126 Further, although attempted class action
lawsuits have raised questions regarding products liability and
misrepresentation on the part of plant-based milk alternatives,
such cases have largely been dismissed on summary judgment or
during the pleading stage of litigation.127
Manufacturers of plant-based dairy products already
differentiate their products from more traditional commodities
protection claim, the Court erroneously uses a ‘rational basis’ analysis, thereby ignoring
the important First Amendment interests implicated by this case.” (citing Police Dept.
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972)). The Court reversed this change in the late
1990s. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182–
86 (1999); 44 Liquormart Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 509–13 (1996).
124 Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480–81 (1989) (the
Court “declin[ed] to impose [the] least-restrictive-means requirement,” and instead
stated that “since the State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, it must
affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we require.” (citations omitted)); see also
Matthew Passalacqua, Note, There’s Something Brewing Within the Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 607, 618–19 (2011).
125 Fox, 492 U.S. at 480–81.
126 See 2017 Chapman Letter, supra note 87, at 3 (In a survey of 814
individuals, only three percent of participants believed the product contained cow’s milk
and only five percent stated they mistakenly purchased soymilk in lieu of cow’s milk.).
127 See, e.g., Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n. v. Harris, 653 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir.
1981) (wherein NMPF “alleged the invalidity of a FDA regulation that authorizes
qualifying food products to bear a label describing these products as ‘substitute[s]’ rather
than as ‘imitation[s],’” and that “the FDA had unlawfully approved the marketing of food
products as cheese substitutes and had unlawfully refused to enforce the regulation against
such products” (alteration in original)); see also Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co., No. 13-CV1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (“[I]t is simply implausible that a
reasonable consumer would mistake a product like soymilk or almond milk with dairy milk
from a cow. The first words in the products’ names should be obvious enough even to the
least discerning of consumers.”); Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 1:17-cv-00117-VC, 2015
WL 9121232, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015) (“Soymilk. . . does not ‘purport [ ] to be’ from a
cow within the meaning of section 343(g).” (alteration in original)).
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by qualifying the word “milk” on their product labels and
advertisements.128 The DAIRY PRIDE Act would require
manufacturers to add an additional term, such as imitation, into
their titles, or drop the word milk altogether and replace it with
more generic language, like beverage.129 Rather than furthering
the needs of the public, such a requirement primarily acts as a
means of insulating the dairy industry from free-market
competition, which some critics of the bill believe to be the main
purpose for advancing the DAIRY PRIDE Act.130
Despite offering seemingly altruistic justifications for
supporting the DAIRY PRIDE Act, more nefarious explanations
may be motivating NMPF and other interested groups in their
pursuit of such drastic legislative action. In SANA’s response to
NMPF’s 2000 letter asking the FDA to enforce 21 U.S.C. § 131.110
to prevent labeling products as “soymilk,” the organization
advanced the theory that “[t]he NMPF letter [was] a barelydisguised effort to try to get the FDA to expend its resources to
protect dairy milk producers from honest free-market competition
by a nutritious and truthfully-described product.”131
Although this argument lacked substantial merit when
first advanced, evidence today may provide comparatively
strong support for this assertion. Today, fifty-eight percent of
consumers drink non-dairy milk and thirty-six percent consume
plant-based meat alternatives.132 Sales of plant-based products
designed to replace meat, dairy, and egg items rose to $3.1
billion, with an 8.1% growth rate.133 Likewise, sales of plantbased milk products rose at a rate of 3.1% as sales of traditional
milk fell by five percent, and sales of other alternative dairy
products rose by twenty percent.134 Further, non-dairy yogurt
sales rose by a staggering fifty-six percent.135 It follows that the
dairy industry might seek drastic action, including usurping the
FDA by directly pursuing decisive legislation, to try to retain
their foothold within the market.136
128 See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 3964, 3965 (Jan. 19, 1979) (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 20702,
20703 (Aug. 2, 1973)).
129 S. 130, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017).
130 See, e.g., GFI Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 14–15.
131 2000 Chapman Letter, supra note 15, at 5.
132 Becky Schilling, The Future of Plant-Based Foods, SUPERMARKET NEWS (Sept.
21, 2017), http://www.supermarketnews.com/consumer-trends/future-plant-based-foods
[https://perma.cc/6AY5-RWHW].
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See Letter from Peter Welch, Member of Cong., et al., to Robert M. Califf,
Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nmpf.org/wp-content/
uploads//Welch-Simpson%20Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV6G-DWQL].
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The New York City Bar Association explicitly referenced
these tactics in a letter issued in support of the 2017 GFI Citizen
Petition, stating that “[w]hile the Petition’s proposed regulation
is not limited in scope to the names of plant-based products,
given the recent effort of politicians to limit the product names
of plant-based products . . . [GFI’s] Petition would limit the
effect of such anti-competitive efforts.”137
Even without the underlying, anti-competitive motivation
however, the DAIRY PRIDE Act cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Although the government possesses a substantial
interest in promoting the consumer health and preventing
deception, the content-based restriction on commercial speech in
the DAIRY PRIDE Act applies to speech that is neither inherently
unlawful nor deceitful. Further, the proposed regulation of “milk”
is unlikely to play any substantive role in advancing the
government’s objectives, and as such, fails to provide a solution
reasonably tailored to suit the government interest. It is unlikely,
given the parameters, that the DAIRY PRIDE Act would
withstand constitutional scrutiny, if challenged.
III.

MOVING FORWARD WITH AN EYE TOWARD COMPROMISE

During the dispute over use of the term “milk,” the dairy
and plant-based alternative industries have proposed potential
modifications to the existing regulatory structure, generally
requiring strict enforcement of existing regulations or
modifications thereto. SANA’s first proposal, from its 1997
citizen petition, served as the catalyst of the present debate.138
At that time, SANA requested that the FDA commissioner
amend Part 102 of the FDA regulations “to recognize ‘soymilk’
as the established common or usual name to be used in labels
and other labeling to identify a beverage of this nature.”139
NMPF fired back, asking that the FDA rigidly enforce their
existing regulatory scheme and prohibit dairy substitutes from
using “milk” in their products’ names.140 The administrative
agency chose not to amend their regulations, while also
functionally declining to follow a strict enforcement policy,
essentially suspending SANA’s proposal in a state of regulatory
137 Letter from Lori Barrett-Peterson, Animal Law Comm. Chair, Ass’n of the Bar
of N.Y. City, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Administration, at 4 (Aug. 23, 2017),
http://documents.nycbar.org/files/FDA_Petition_Milk_Labeling_ANIMAL_8_23_17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AD7C-6RZZ].
138 Calderon, et al., supra note 1.
139 SANA Citizen Petition, supra note 8, at 1.
140 2000 Byrne Letter, supra note 13, at 2–3 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 131.110).
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limbo.141 Even after the passage of approximately twenty years,
the same pattern persists.142
In 2017, GFI drafted a new citizen petition. Like the original
petition from SANA, the current proposal requests a change to
existing FDA regulations. Specifically, GFI requested that the
FDA amend 21 CFR § 102.5, to add the following language after part (d):
(e) The common or usual name of food may be—
(1) the common or usual name of another food preceded by a
qualifying word or phrase that identifies (i) an alternative
plant or animal source that replaces the main characterizing
ingredient(s) or component(s) of such other food, or (ii) the
absence of a primary characterizing plant or animal source,
or of a nutrient, allergen, or other well-known characterizing
substance, that is ordinarily present in such other food; or
(2) any other word or phrase comprised of two or more terms,
which may be separated by hyphens or spaces; but if such
name includes the common or usual name of any other food,
it must effectively notify consumers that the product is
distinct from such other food.143

The GFI petition asserts that its proposed regulatory
alteration would not violate Section 403 of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,144 as long as it would not cause a reasonable
consumer to be misled or deceived.145 The FDA sent a response
letter to GFI in which it acknowledged receipt of the petition.146
Here, in contrast to its previous non-involvement policy, the
FDA’s reply stated that the agency had been inundated with
“competing priorities,” and claimed that it would “complete [its]
review of the [Good Food Institute petition] and consider any
amendments to [FDA] regulations as warranted in the contest
of other programs within the Center,” rather than issuing an
outright refusal to act.147 The reply from the FDA does not,
however, promise to address the solutions proposed in GFI’s
Calderon, et al., supra note 1.
Linda A. Goldstein & Theodore J. Kobus III, Decades-Long Milk War Froths
on, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1ea058a
8-1b4d-4f85-9b97-1581f9bbda43 [https://perma.cc/RJ5E-4762].
143 GFI Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 2.
144 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403, 52 Stat. 1040, 1047
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). Section 403 of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act regulates misbranded food, nutritional labeling, and disclosures. Id.
145 GFI Citizen Petition, supra note 22, at 2.
146 Dynna Bigby, Supervisor Admin. Proceedings Specialist, U.S. Federal Food
and Drug Administration Division of Dockets Management, to Nigel Barrella, Good Food
Inst. (Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with Brooklyn Law Review).
147 Interim Response Letter from Douglas A. Balentine, Dir., Ctr. for Food
Safety & Applied Nutrition to Nigel Barrella, Good Food Inst. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-P-1298-0091 [https://perma.cc/5DSD-USLK].
141
142
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petition.148 Interestingly, approximately one year after receipt of
the GFI petition, the FDA requested comments regarding a
regulation that might be substantively similar to the DAIRY
PRIDE Act.149 Although this mitigates the likelihood that the
FDA will abstain from taking concrete action absent
congressional mandate, it does not ensure that such action will
be taken or necessarily indicate what avenue, if any, the agency
will pursue to accomplish its goals.
Thus far, all solutions proffered by SANA, NMPF, GFI and
others, to end the abiding debate over use of the term milk, have
proven unsuccessful. In spite of regulatory uncertainty, new
foods, manufactured with substitute ingredients, proliferated
throughout the market over the past twenty years.150 Regardless
of whether the proposed restrictions are codified through the
DAIRY PRIDE Act or an agency promulgated regulation, the
broad commercial speech restrictions encompassed in the bill will
likely impose an unconstitutional restraint on manufacturers’
First Amendment right to free speech.151 Still, the longevity and
impassioned nature of debate over use of “milk” necessitates that
some action should be taken to resolve the conflict.
Rather than pursuing solutions proposed by GFI, NMPF,
or SANA, the FDA should add regulations to control the size and
location of disclaimers on product labels and in advertising, but
expressly allow dairy substitute products to use “milk” and other
dairy specific terms in product names and advertisements.
While not completely satisfying the demands of any of the
interested parties, this solution occupies a middle ground, and
serves the governmental interests articulated in the DAIRY
PRIDE Act, namely, to promote consumer health and protect
against deception, without implicating the level of judicial
scrutiny triggered by content-based speech restrictions.152
148 Keller & Heckman LLP, FDA Delays Decision on Plant-Based Milk Labeling
Petition, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fda-delaysdecision-plant-based-milk-labeling-petition [https://perma.cc/RYW7-4YD6].
149 See Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based products,
Notice, Extension of Comment Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,775 (Nov. 21, 2018); Use of the Names
of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based products, Notice, Request for Comments, 83
Fed. Reg. 49,103 (Sept. 28, 2018); see also NMPF Citizen Petition, supra note 48.
150 Calderon et al., supra note 1.
151 See supra Part II.
152 Requiring that alternative dairy product manufacturers alter product labels
and advertisements so as to clearly communicate an item’s contents to consumers would
impose a compelled disclosure requirement, and as such, would not act as an outright
prohibition on manufacturers’ freedom of speech. As such, a court would likely evaluate
the restriction under the test articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, instead of applying the Central Hudson analysis. In
Zauderer, the Court declined to follow Central Hudson’s four-part test, reasoning that
disclosure requirements are fundamentally different from prohibitions, and as such,
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The FDA employed a similar regulation strategy, though
admittedly on a much smaller scale, when it settled a conflict over
use of the term “mayonnaise.”153 The dispute over regulation of
“mayonnaise,” aptly referred to as the “Mayo Wars” by the media,
revolved around a single product, Just Mayo, an egg-free, vegan
mayonnaise substitute.154 The conflict arose because the
mayonnaise standard of identity requires products bearing the
mayonnaise or mayo nomenclature to include eggs as an
ingredient.155 In August 2015, the FDA issued a letter, accusing the
Just Mayo manufacturer, Hampton Creek, of misbranding the
product pursuant to section 403(r)(1)(A) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act.156 The letter also alleged that that the company’s
Siracha sauce was similarly misbranded and that the statements
on the company’s website misled consumers into believing
insufficiently substantiated health claims.157 Rather than forcing
Hampton Creek to rename Just Mayo, the FDA accepted a
compromise solution wherein the company would change its
packaging by making phrases like “Egg-Free” more visible to
consumers.158 Although applying a similar solution in the war on
milk would require the regulations be applied on a much larger
scale, the FDA should afford manufacturers of dairy substitute
products the same deference it gave to Hampton Creek.
The FDA should require manufacturers of plant-based
alternative products to alter a product’s packaging if the agency
determines such action is necessary to accurately communicate
the composition of the item to consumers. These modifications
should be limited, in all but the most egregious cases, to
changing the size and placement of disclaimers that
differentiate such substitute products from their more
commonplace counterparts. Moreover, unless a product is
clearly misbranded, pursuant to Part 403 of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,159 the FDA should expressly permit the use of
determined that the government need only demonstrate that “disclosure requirements
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
153 See Beth Kowitt, The Mayo Wars Just Ended, FORTUNE (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/12/17/hampton-creek-just-mayo-fda/ [https://perma.cc/5DY8-8ZZS].
154 Id.
155 21 C.F.R. § 169.140 (2018).
156 Warning Letter from William A. Correll, Jr., Dir., Ctr. for Food Safety &
Applied Nutrition, to Joshua Tetrick, Founder & C.E.O., Hampton Creek Foods, Inc., at
1–3 (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/
ucm458824.htm [https://perma.cc/28E3-T4TZ].
157 Id.
158 See Kowitt, supra note 153.
159 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403, 52 Stat. 1040, 1047
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)); 21 U.S.C. § 343
(2012 & Supp. V 2018).
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“milk” and other dairy specific terms in names, labels, and
advertisements for substitute products. Additionally, to prevent
manufacturers of dairy substitute products from misusing
“milk,” the FDA should encourage consumers and regulated
parties to take an active role in product regulation. To
participate, consumers should be able to file lawsuits against
infringing parties and bring complaints to the FDA directly, as
is the case in the current regulatory scheme.
Big dairy and its supporters will likely argue that
consumers’ lawsuits have historically proven to be ineffective
and that a solution based primarily at regulating packaging and
labels is an insufficient means of protecting consumers.160 This
argument, however, lacks merit and should not dissuade the
FDA from pursuing the proposed regulatory agenda. The failure
of previous lawsuits likely does not indicate a fundamental
problem with this system, but rather demonstrates that
alternative milk product names and labels are sufficiently clear
so as not to mislead a reasonable consumer, or in the words of
one federal judge “even the least discerning of consumers.”161
It must be conceded that no alteration to the current
regulatory landscape, or even the perpetuation thereof, exists
without added costs. Before the FDA reaches a final ruling on
important final or proposed regulations, it conducts an economic
analysis, which includes “an assessment of the costs, benefits, and
cost-effectiveness of the action, as well as assessments of the costs,
benefits and cost-effectiveness of the most promising alternative
actions.”162 Thus, the FDA must expend time and financial
resources to create, examine, and ultimately reach a conclusion on
how and whether a regulation should proceed.163 Further, the
dispute over use of “milk” impacts a multitude of interest groups,
manufacturers, and products, making the requisite analysis much
broader than that which was required in the context of the “Mayo
Wars.”164 The possible market impact will probably meet the
standard of importance to trigger an economic analysis, and as
160 See e.g., Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co., No. 13-CV-1953, 2013 WL 6492353,
at *1, 4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013).
161 Id. at *4.
162 Economic Impact Analyses of FDA Regulations, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/
EconomicAnalyses/ [https://perma.cc/S847-USL4]; see also Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82
Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 14 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011);
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
163 See Economic Impact Analyses of FDA Regulations, supra note 162.
164 The
Dairy & Dairy Alternatives Market, PACKAGED FACTS (2018),
https://www.packagedfacts.com/Content/Featured-Markets/Dairy-and-Dairy-Alternatives
[https://perma.cc/XQA4-LGPR] (demonstrating the extensiveness of the dairy and plantbased alternatives industries).
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such, will likely require that the FDA invest substantial resources
before it can bring a conclusion to the abiding conflict.165
While the cost of completing an economic analysis will
likely be substantial, this initial expenditure should not
dissuade the agency from issuing guidance and bringing the
conflict over use of the term “milk” to an end.166 If the FDA fails
to act, the present dispute may linger indefinitely, which could
lead to continued uncertainty and increased costs for producers,
manufacturers, and consumers.167
CONCLUSION
The decreasing demand for dairy products and
proliferation of substitute items created an atmosphere in which
a war over the use of the word “milk” has persisted across
decades. The twenty-year debate between the dairy and plantbased alternative industries may, however, be heading toward
an apparent end. If the DAIRY PRIDE Act passes Congress, it
is unlikely it will withstand judicial scrutiny under the four-part
test articulated in Central Hudson.
There are less restrictive and constitutionally viable
means the FDA could use to regulate “milk.” One such example
would be to enact a solution similar to that which the regulatory
agency used when resolving the “mayo wars” conflict—requiring
more conspicuous labeling.168 Yet, a question remains: Is any of
this regulation really necessary? Consumers today can bring
action against manufacturers for misleading labels. The lack of
165 It does not appear that the FDA conducted an economic analysis in reaching
its decision on the dispute over use of the term mayonnaise, likely because it did not
center around an important proposed or final FDA regulation. The requirement that
regulators conduct a cost-benefit analysis extends exclusively to regulations, and as such
would not have been considered in the “mayo wars” because that case ended in
settlement. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
166 While the FDA’s policy of inaction may be the result of a general apathy toward
the issue, there may be other explanations for the executive agency’s seemingly dismissive
behavior. For example, since the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992, a
significant portion of FDA funding comes directly from pharmaceutical companies, which
in all likelihood has an effect on the alignment of the agency’s priorities. Prescription Drug
User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 379g); see also Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments (PDUFA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/Prescription
DrugUserFee/default.htm [https://perma.cc/93Y6-R29Y].
167 See, e.g., AC Shilton, The Battle Over the Word ‘Milk,’ OUTSIDE (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.outsideonline.com/2152336/should-nut-milk-be-considered-milk [https://perma.cc/
BZ7R-ZVV6] (explaining the consequences “banning [ ] use [of the term ‘milk’] from nondairy
products could severely impact plant-based products”). But see St. Pierre, supra note 23 (Canada
banned plant-based products from using “milk” in product names in 2009, but purchase of dairy
products has continued to decline.).
168 See, e.g., Kowitt, supra note 153.
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success of suits challenging use of “milk” to date likely does not
indicate a fundamental problem with this system, but rather
shows that alternative milk product names and labels are
sufficiently clear so as not to mislead a reasonable consumer.169
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